establishing the fiduciary relationship one party is always dominant and another subordinate.
11
Vulnerability and reliance in contract may justify supervision of the relationship, but not imposition of the requirement of one party to act loyally in the other's interests. 12 The employee is particularly vulnerable in AE as he has no right to contribute to the process of choosing a pension product or provider. Asymmetries of power have created an "emerging trend to insist upon disclosure" 13 but this may not justify exacting loyalty from one party to the other in the relationship.
14 The exercise of power by one party over the other or exercise of discretion or judgement might also define the fiduciary relationship. 15 16 In AE the employer has complete discretion in respect of product provider and benefits. The issues of trust, confidence, power, inequality and dependency demonstrate the roles of the parties in the relationship. However, there are many instances of inequality in contractual dealing which do not equate to fiduciary obligations as one party has not relaxed selfvigilance. 17 Financial advisors are one of the recognised categories of fiduciary agents 18 but this is because the financial advisor voluntarily assumes the obligation. In the employment relationship, the employee relies on and trusts the employer to act in his best interests when dealing with his pension.
Information asymmetries may then lead to the conclusion that the employer owes fiduciary duties to Fiduciary duties are often presumed where a particular relationship or status exists 20 and the law now includes many relationships; which can make identification of a fiduciary relationship difficult and heavily dependent on the given facts. 21 Some question the approach of using status to define obligations, 22 arguing instead that the undertakings of the particular matter are key. Others argue that this contractual approach is incorrect with fiduciary obligation sometimes operating in "opposition to intention. 23 " The status of the parties in any case will provide evidence of the nature of undertakings.
24
The question of whether the pension product provider or the employer's financial advisors owe any fiduciary obligations to the employee also arises. This could be in the act of providing information to employees or otherwise dealing with pre or post contract issues. For AE, contractual terms are generally agreed between the employer and the provider/advisors and this might lead to an expectation of fiduciary duties owed by the advisor to the employer. Contractual provisions may seek to specifically exclude this and it will depend on the nature of the relationship. The asymmetry in information and power in the employment relationship demonstrates the employee's vulnerability which might indicate fiduciary obligations are owed to the employee.
39
However the mutuality in the relationship means the employer is entitled to have regard to its own interests rather than simply considering those of the employee and this mutuality is different to the fiduciary relationship. 40 There are aspects of financial control in deductions of pension contributions but these are often not specified in the contract of employment. The holding of assets in this way may characterise this part of the relationship as fiduciary by agency, discussed further below. key element of this is the deduction of employee contributions from salary which the employer is then entrusted to invest on behalf of the employee. In holding the employees' assets and using discretion and judgement to invest them it is difficult to imagine that the employer does not owe a duty of some kind but whether this is fiduciary in nature is unclear because of competing employer interests.
If the undertakings were contractually agreed, without the imposition of AE, it would seem to be a voluntary fiduciary undertaking but the fact that the undertakings are imposed by the AE legislation rather than voluntarily assumed may prevent such a finding.
(2 
C. EMPLOYER AS AN AGENT
Even if there is no general fiduciary relationship, it can be argued that in taking charge of arranging the pension contract, choosing provider, deducting contributions from the employee's salary and making decisions about when to change providers or schemes in future, the employer acts as an agent of the employee. The power of the agent (employer) in this instance, is to enter into and act under a legally valid contract on behalf of the principal (employee).
53
Where employers use a trust based scheme for AE, the employer does not contract with a provider on behalf of the employee but facilitates admission to a scheme and the employee can deal directly with the scheme administrator. The scheme trustees will then owe fiduciary duties to scheme members.
However, where a personal pension arrangement is used, the employer contracts on behalf of the employee to take out the personal pension contract but will also contract with the provider separately in relation to the plan administration. The product provider or financial advisor may act as the employer's agent in providing information and assistance to employees on its behalf, although standard contractual terms with the provider may exclude agency obligations in this context.
The contract of employment is will usually make reference to pension and AE in general terms to maintain flexibility but agency may arise without formal contractual terms. Facts and circumstances may be averred to prove the existence of the agency relationship. (1) The Agency Relationship
The generic terms in the contract of employment regarding pensions and lack of contractual instruction by the principal (employee) are not fatal to a finding of agency, by consent or under contract, as the employer is responsible for implementing AE under statute and contracting on behalf of the employee in the context of the employment law contract. Even where there are instructions in recognised agency situations, these are often incomplete. 57 In Scotland, non-consensual agency might be established where the power ceded to the agent is sufficient to establish the relationship, like implied terms in the contract. The creation involves "the grant of legal powers to the so-called agent, and the creation of correlative liabilities in the principal. 58 " However, more recent emphasis on the contractual nature of agency in Scotland means that consent is more likely to be inferred to create the contract rather than saying it is a non-consensual contract of agency 59 . Rather than creating a general agency it can be argued that the employee cedes power to the employer for AE to contract with pension providers on his behalf and that the employer has control of the employee's assets (deductions from salary as contributions). This ceding of power is evidence of tacit consent to the contractual agency relationship and may be used in Scotland to imply the terms of agency to the transaction. However, the nature of AE being imposed by statute may go against a finding of consensual agency.
The employee may be said to have granted authority to the employer to contract with any pension provider it chooses although, with AE, the employee is simply advised of AE and he has no right to opt-out until after the contract is concluded. The employee has no say in the choice of provider and the employer's unfettered power may go against a finding of agency. 60 However, if we consider other examples of agency, such as the lawyer acting as agent for the client, many decisions will be made without the client's express consent and the client may lack knowledge to properly supervise the actions of the agent. The employer is not completely controlled by the principal's wishes and must also follow other rules and requirements. (2015) undertaken on behalf of the principal and for AE the employee cannot ask the employer not to autoenrol him as this is required externally by operation of the AE legislation. The characterisation of the relationship by the parties themselves is also significant but not determinative.
61
The employer is unlikely to be a general agent for the employee in all matters but a specific AE agency might be implied in respect of the specific purpose of choosing a pension scheme for AE where there is evidence to support the inference. 62 Implication will depend on the indicators or reliance and undertaking of responsibilities 63 and whether trust and confidence is reposed. 64 This may be important for employees who rely on the relationship with the employer to ensure the best decisions are made. If there is an implied agency in the specific role of the employer selecting a pension scheme for AE this may increase the communication requirements requiring employers to
give employees more specific information and warnings.
(2) Consequences of Agency An agent has implied authority to perform those actions required to execute the agency agreement 65 but as there are likely to be no contractual terms for AE, all the terms will be implied. 66 If it can be implied that the employer acts as an agent does this mean that particular standards would need to be adhered to in choosing the provider, scheme and making decisions about changes in future? In addition to fiduciary duties, agents also owe separate non-fiduciary duties which may be just as significant as the fiduciary duties 67 namely; the duty to follow instructions; to exercise skill and care;
duty not to delegate and duty to account. In English law the fiduciary duties may give rise to a claim in equity but the lack of equitable remedies in Scotland makes the distinction less important. 68 For AE, the employee cannot give instructions to the employer as the employer is required to implement AE under statutory obligations. For non-gratuitous agency, such as this, the agent must "act with that diligence and discretion which a man of prudence uses in his affairs. 69 " The employer does not act here as a professional agent but must demonstrate such diligence and discretion in actions.
Consequently, it could be argued that employers must demonstrate that they acted with care in making choices about pension provider, selecting pension plans and benefits and administering the arrangement. The employer may decide not to spend money on advice and pick any provider or scheme that comes to hand without any thought. itself more care might be exercised. Failure to exercise the same care when choosing an AE plan could then be a breach of the agent's standard of care toward the principal as implied in the agency contract. The cost of obtaining advice on the continuing compliance with AE might also prevent an employer changing scheme or provider even if the existing scheme offers poor value compared to other products. In the employment relationship the employer has a legitimate interest in considering its business needs as well as the needs of the employee and this may prevent a finding that the employer acts as an agent in relation to AE. In an agency relationship, the fiduciary duties and nonfiduciary duties of care might assist the employee in claiming for loss arising from poor decisions by the employer as his agent. The facts and circumstances of the agency relationship can limit the scope of obligations; and agents have long been recognised as acting for single transactions or as special agents in Scotland, which further restricts fiduciary and non-fiduciary obligations. 70 Courts have imposed fiduciary duties in ad hoc relationships to deal with the agency problem (failure to contractually anticipate all the obligations and opportunism in asymmetrical relationships) using concepts such as influence, trust and confidence and superiority to justify the inference.
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In the case of the employer acting to contract with a provider for the employee, the fact that the employer also holds the employees' assets (deductions from salary as contributions) may be significant. The deductions remain the employee's money but are dealt with by the employer (possibly as agent). Where the money is deducted and paid into an occupational pension scheme then this is held in trust for the beneficiaries of the scheme and the funds are entirely separate from both employer's and employee's funds. However, where a personal pension contract is used, the funds are paid over to the product provider and are held as assets in a policy in the name of the employee. The deductions and payment process are regulated by the AE legislation and require timeous payment and accounting to the employee but it is the employer who is responsible for ensuring calculations are correct and making the salary deductions and transfers.
Agents are also obliged to impart knowledge to the principal so information given to the employer by the provider should be passed on. 72 In AE the product provider is often contracted by the employer to provide the employees with information and support in relation to AE and it is not clear what role the provider takes on as they are party to contracts with both the employer and the employee. Most providers will offer strict standard terms excluding any liability as an agent or otherwise.
Many indicators of agency are present in AE with the employer enjoying superiority in the relationship, the employee reposing trust in the employer and the employer being ceded power to manage the employees' money and select a pension provider and plan. However, the difficulty in identifying the terms of the agreement and the fact that the undertakings arise from statutory obligations, rather than consent, may go against a finding that the employer acts as an agent in this regard. It might be difficult to demonstrate that the employer has chosen to undertake its duties but this is not fatal to any claim. The facts surrounding the AE relationship look like a case of agency giving rise to fiduciary and non-fiduciary obligations owed by the employer to its employees.
However, it is not sufficiently clear to say with certainty that a legal remedy exists under this head and clarification on the extent of employer's responsibilities is needed. terms may be read into the AE undertaking whereby the employer exercises discretion, such as the discretion to choose a pension provider or whether to change provider, or this might instead justify statutory change to correct the "inadequacy of the ordinary private law. 84 " For example, the House of Lords implied terms into junior doctors' contracts of employment to provide that they would be advised of pension changes which they could not be expected to know about. 85 However, the ratio on this point was very precise and great care was taken to prevent the widening of any employer obligations 86 in general terms. This recognises the different bargaining positions of the parties and has been followed in subsequent decisions.
D. CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS ARISING FROM THE CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT

87
The contract of employment contains a reciprocal duty of good faith which extends to powers exercised by the employer in relation to the pension scheme. 88 Good faith is a distinct and differing obligation from a fiduciary duty in that it will not usually require one party to place another party's interests above its own interests and the intention in a course of action is irrelevant. 89 In the Imperial case, the company had a clear interest in the operation of the scheme, as it would bear excess costs, and so a fiduciary obligation could not be implied as that would require the employer to consider only the members' interests. 90 However, an implied obligation of good faith could be read into the contract to apply to "The exercise of his rights and powers under a pension scheme as they do to the other rights and powers of the employer. 91 So whilst the employer has the right to consider its own financial interests, the implied obligation of good faith ensures that decisions must not be undertaken in a way which undermines trust and confidence. 92 If the employer is considered to be an agent of the employee, the duties are so comprehensive that an additional duty to act in good faith is unnecessary. 93 However, if there is no agency then it is necessary to consider the extent of any good faith obligations arising under the contract of employment. The discretion to choose or change provider and set contribution levels come under this umbrella of employer discretion to be exercised in good faith.
(a) Mutual Trust and Confidence
Trust and confidence has been considered in relation to the provision of information to employees/members and can cause difficulties. The narrow provisions of Scally have not been widened and the onus remains with employees to ensure information is considered with no obligation on employers to ensure it is read or to warn employees of consequences of actions. 94 If the relationship was categorised as fiduciary then a positive obligation by the employer to disclose any negative consequences from the proposed action would exist. There is a close connection between fiduciary obligations and the implied term of trust and confidence but trust and confidence has a different and distinct meaning. Namely, that the parties do not conduct themselves in a way which is likely to destroy the relationship of trust and confidence between them. 95 The purpose of the implied term is to facilitate the proper functioning of the contract and protect the employment relationship.
This recognises that the employment relationship is distinct from commercial relations and operates to prevent exploitation of workers 96 and it is particularly important to guard against abuse in the exercise of discretionary powers by the employer. 97 The employer's motives are irrelevant.
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"What is significant is the impact of the employer's behaviour on the employee rather than what the employer intended."
99
The duty of trust and confidence has been used by the courts to compel employers "to conduct themselves in a proactive manner by imposing a standard of care. 100 " Scally is authority for the principle that the employer is under no duty to exercise reasonable care in respect of the economic well-being of employees, but contrasts with the Visa case 101 from which it appears that a similar The court is not entitled to substitute its own view of what a reasonable decision is but instead considers the rationality of the decision made and whether the process is flawed by failure to consider relevant facts or consideration of irrelevant ones. 115 On this basis, the employer choosing a scheme for AE must exercise the decision in a way that demonstrates that the process is rational and is in keeping with the obligation of trust and confidence. The bystander might ask whether the employer has a duty under the contract of employment to take care in choosing the provider. The parties may agree as they had assumed this was the case. However, the parties may not intend a special level of care to be taken and the employer might argue that only the minimum required to comply with the AE legislation would be included in the contract. Whilst the employer has a right to consider its own interests in making these decisions, the factors such as trust, asymmetries of power and information, reliance and expectation will all be evidence of the expectations of the employee as a party to the contract. The increasing significance of good faith in contractual performance of employment contracts may require the employer to demonstrate that discretionary powers were exercised rationally.
(c) Duty to Advise
Under AE there are specific information requirements requiring employers to give workers certain key information. 117 The employer retains responsibility for providing this information, even if it contracts with a pension provider to provide the information, 118 and this could create some tensions.
The standard employer/provider contract may exclude the pension provider's liability for loss arising from its failures in this regard leaving the employer responsible to the regulator and potentially in respect of civil claims by employees. Technical failures to comply with the AE legislation will be enforced by the Pensions Regulator, but in requiring the employer to provide information to employees this could place the employer in the position of being seen to offer advice, depending on the nature of information given. This would explain the fear and reluctance of employers to discuss pension benefits beyond the basic information given. 119 If the employer tries to provide a better quality scheme which allows the employee access to its own financial advisor this might be construed as giving advice which could leave it open to claims in delict/tort.
Claims might arise on the basis of poor information about choices, contributions or in respect of the employer's decisions relating to the provider itself. It seems unlikely that a contractual claim in respect of failure to provide the statutory required information would be successful as that would fall within the remit of the Pensions Regulator under AE. However, knowledge of others is not an objective test and, if a positive finding of fiduciary duties is made, the employer would have to consider regularly whether the form and content of information given was enough for the principal to make decisions. The Deputy Pensions Ombudsman recently 120 considered accuracy of information and whether requests were for advice or information. Referring the member to an intranet site without further guidance was deemed inadequate and, as she had relied on inaccurate information, she was to be reinstated in the pension scheme. This determination does not sit comfortably with Scally as the member had the information she needed but it highlights the difficulties of balancing providing adequate information and providing advice.
Other determinations found no general duty on an employer to provide information or advice to employees to prevent economic loss, emphasising the specialist nature of advice. 121 The employer had not assumed any responsibility to provide advice and liability in tort, under a duty of care, could only succeed where there was an express or implied contractual duty to provide advice. Following Scally, any claim in tort is bound to fail if there is no contractual obligation to advise.
My empirical research 122 demonstrates that employers are cautious about providing information that might be construed as advice which results in more generic information being provided. Employees were unsure about whether advice or information was provided. 124 The fact that the parties had signed the agreement meant they were bound by its terms even if they had not read them. Product providers usually exclude such liability by specifying that only information, not advice, is provided.
The employment contract is likely to be silent on the issue and it will be a matter of fact to determine if the information given by an employer makes it clear that the relationship is not advisory or whether it might be reasonable for employees to rely on the information as advice. Lack of specification of the standards to be followed by the employer in implementing AE may also to be fatal to any claim based on the existence of agreement between the parties.
(d) Duty to Avoid Economic Loss
Economic loss was considered recently where advice was sought and given with assurances and reliance on the advice resulted in loss. 125 Mr Lennon could not sue for breach of contract as he was a member of the police force and had no contract of employment. Instead he sued in tort in respect of economic loss arising from a breach of duty of care arising from an assumption of responsibility by a personnel officer for a pension transfer. Although the personnel officer was not a professional advisor, she had special knowledge and led Mr Lennon to believe that he could rely on her which was sufficient to attract the duty to give advice. 126 The duty of care arises from an express assumption of liability for a particular matter, which was relied upon.
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The implied term to prevent economic loss where there is no undertaking of advice, is unlikely to be inferred contractually on the basis that it is too significant an extension of the existing law and "impose an unfair and unreasonable burden on employers.
128 " This public policy constraint of unreasonable burden on employers may also prevent a finding that employers are obliged to do anything other than the AE minimum. Where the employer assumes responsibility for the giving of financial advice then it is under a duty to take reasonable care in the giving of advice. However, that it is quite different to imply that the employer is obliged to provide such advice or to generally safeguard the employee's well-being. With the simplification of schemes to reduce costs, advice may not be available in future. Employees may ask more questions of the employer but these will go unanswered as employers and HR representatives are now very wary of answering questions which might be construed as advice. This means that whilst there may be a remedy for poor advice, employers may choose not to respond to questions and instead refer employees to the product provider. The product provider may also disclaim any responsibility to answer questions or advise (particularly at the pre-contract stage) and this leaves the employee with an information gap, the effects of which are exacerbated by AE. It was considered unnecessary to include provision for financial advice in AE but it is clear that in failing to obtain advice some individuals will suffer as a consequence of the regime. Employees would have to understand this and then pay for advice which acts as a barrier to understanding and engagement and can also be described as a further cost of the regime.
(2 Regulator, questions which relate more generally to the contract of employment or relationships may still be considered under private law. In considering whether the mutual trust obligation is breached by an employer being careless in discretionary decisions it is important to remember that the employer has a legitimate business interest in implementing AE in a cost effective way for its business. The
Pensions Ombudsman may also be asked to consider such issues but, at present, it is unclear if a remedy would exist in the circumstances described above.
The information requirements may put employers in a difficult position if they do not get the correct balance between giving enough information to inform employees without giving employees the impression that they have undertaken to provide advice. Brodie talks of the importance of fair procedure in relation to such matters as pay reviews and this may also apply to decisions made in relation to AE. to breach the obligation. 132 As a minimum, I would argue that employers should be able to demonstrate that a fair process has been followed when making discretionary decisions under AE.
E. DUTIES OWED BY THE PENSION PROVIDER OR ADVISORS
The position in relation to contract based pensions is complicated and depends on factual circumstances and documentation. Whilst providers may influence the interests of members, this in itself is insufficient to create a fiduciary obligation owed by the provider and contractual terms which support member's expectations are required, as discussed above. 133 There are difficulties in applying this contractual model in AE as it is the employer which engages with the provider at the pre-contract stage to establish the employee's personal pension contract with the provider. After enrolment, the employee has a personal pension policy with the provider and can enforce its terms, change contributions or funds. Whether fiduciary duties are owed to the employee depends on whether advice is given. 134 Often the provider is not involved in the advisory process at all and an independent advisor is employed to find a scheme for the employer. The advisor will be contracted to provide advice to the employer on a suitable scheme which complies with AE within particular parameters of cost or quality as directed by the employer. In this situation the advisor may owe duties to the employer which are contractual and fiduciary but is unlikely to owe these to the employee unless the provider has engaged in providing direct advice to employees. Duties to employees are limited to those contained in the personal pension policy. It may also be the case that, where the claimant is someone other than the party being given direct advice, the middle party may be responsible for negligent advice. For example, the employer may be liable if it passes on advice to the employee that it has received from its own advisor but courts are reluctant to impose such duties 139 and would likely approach fiduciary duties in the same way.
Information given directly to employees by advisors is governed by the FCA rules. 140 However, the UK explicitly provides a remedy for breaches suffered by private persons under the Financial Services and Markets Act (FSMA) 2000. 141 It has been argued that COBS will form strong evidence of required standards and that private law duties of agency and delict will be breached where there is a failure to comply with COBS prior to conclusion of a contract. 142 The analogy with the AE scenario is that the pension provider or advisor may owe obligations under COBS to the employees in the period prior to conclusion of the contract effecting the personal pension.
F. CONCLUSIONS
This paper has considered whether private law provides an adequate remedy for those who suffer loss as a consequence of the AE regime. Pension changes may be accompanied by complex information and loss or detriment may arise from the provision of information and advice and the exercise of employer discretion under AE. If employers are found to owe particular standards of care when exercising discretionary decisions under AE, this might improve both the default positions and the level of engagement of employees. The asymmetric information and power in the AE relationship may result in a finding that the employer acts as a fiduciary or agent in respect of the AE decisions it makes for the employee. If pension providers and advisors engage with employees during this process they may also owe duties to the employees. Vulnerability, exercise of discretion, management of affairs by one party, status of the parties and contractual provisions may all indicate the existence of a fiduciary obligation. Whilst the whole employer/employee relationship is unlikely to be categorised as fiduciary, some aspects may be. The employment contract is likely to be silent on much of AE, but terms may be implied to infer duties. Even if there is no finding of fiduciary duties, the employer may act as an agent for the employee in arranging his AE pension which would require the employer to demonstrate that care was taken in exercising discretionary decisions; such as choice of provider, default funds and plan structure. The contract of employment may also require the employer to fulfil its AE duties to a particular standard. The implied duties of mutual trust and confidence and good faith may impose a standard of care in respect of AE compliance. There is no obligation on the employer to provide advice to employees but where this is proffered then this may prove actionable in delict where there is a failure in the duty of care in providing that advice. Employees may also have a direct right of action against the pension provider or professional advisors if it can be established that they failed to comply with the FCA handbook in some way in their dealings with the employee.
Where a policy produces negative effects then there should be a means of redress, either by the courts, as outlined here, or by extension of the AE regulations by Pensions Regulator guidance or further statutory codification. Whilst it may be possible to argue that these duties are present and create obligations, it is not clear and the costs involved in bringing such claims may also be prohibitive.
Further statutory amendment to the AE legislation, outlining the extent of duties and processes in the implementation of AE, would provide clarity and certainty. Without such clarification it is possible that, in twenty years' time as people start to draw these benefits, claims may emerge which are problematic for employers and employees alike.
